Heather Mills and Paul McCartney: Full Judge's ruling

Mar 18 2008

Wife's Capital Needs

181.The wife's aspiration, as per her open offer, is to own, in addition to Pean's Wood and Angel's Reach, the properties at "Heather House" in Los Angeles, 11 Pintail on Long Island, and to be given funds between £8m and £12.5m to purchase a home in London, about £3m to purchase a New York City property, and funds of between £500,000 to £750,000 to purchase an office in London or Brighton.
182.Her case is that there should not be such a disparity between her lifestyle and that of the husband such as could or might impact upon Beatrice.  She seeks to contrast her, reasonable she would say, demands with the large and diverse property holdings of the husband.  She is deeply involved in charitable work and needs an office from which to conduct her charitable, as well as business, activities.
183.In my judgment, her case overlooks the fact that all of the husband's properties were acquired before their marriage, in some cases long before, with the exception of "Heather House".  If the wife was being truthful in her evidence to the Senior District Judge in June 2007 (which I assume she was) - see paragraph 192 below - she will not be working in Los Angeles (or indeed the USA) and thus has no need of a home there.  So far as an office is concerned, there is plenty of room for one in the spacious property at Pean's Wood.  I see no justification whatever for homes on Long Island or in New York City.
184.The wife and Beatrice are well housed at Pean's Wood; indeed the husband would say over housed compared to his home, Blossom Wood, on his Peasmarsh estate, or the Cabin (which was demolished because no planning permission had been obtained).  But Mr Mostyn made clear that Pean's Wood is not to be taken as an excessive purchase.  I am satisfied that the wife chose that house freely and in the knowledge that that was to be her and, when Beatrice was with her, Beatrice's home for the foreseeable future.  The wife now says she feels a prisoner there, as she put it, in the middle of nowhere.  I find that inconsistent with her having already spent on it £675,000 and wanting another £400,000 to put in a swimming-pool.
185.The wife wishes to have funds to acquire a London property, indeed a substantial London property of in excess of £8m.  Mr Mostyn submitted that whether the wife was entitled to a "second property" was a "matter for debate".  However, if contrary to his submission, she should, nevertheless he submitted that any London property should be conservative and manageable, that any such property will be "particularly susceptible to the argument that it may be folded into the wife's income fund in years to come, per Flick, as being beyond the wife's strict need", and that such an acquisition carries with it an implication as to her earning capacity i.e. that it will be used to further her career opportunities.
186.In my judgment, it is important for the wife that she is assisted to recover and thereafter develop her earning capacity.  I doubt that that will happen solely from Pean's Wood.  It is much more likely to happen if the wife has a property in London. But, in my judgment, it is reasonable for that to be in the nature of a spacious flat with a minimum of 3 bedrooms.  I have seen agents' particulars of properties put forward by the husband for properties of £2m or less.  The wife did not like them because they are not on a par with Cavendish.  I agree they are not.  But a flat costing £2.5m inclusive of stamp duty and legal fees and furnishing seems to me to be reasonable.  If, of course, the wife wishes to purchase something more expensive then she can sell Angel's Rest which would raise another £2m.  Alternatively, Pean's Wood and/or Angel's Rest would provide sufficient security to raise further monies to buy a more expensive London property.
187.Thus I conclude she needs £2.5m to buy a London property.  If the wife's aspiration is limited to a London property costing £2.5m in my judgment she should be able to keep Angel's Rest and not, as Mr Mostyn, submitted, have it treated as part of her "Duxbury" fund.  Such a submission gives every suggestion that the husband wishes to be mean-minded, which, having seen the husband in the witness-box, I do not believe him to be.  I am satisfied that Angel's Rest does mean much to the wife and she and Beatrice can enjoy time there together as they have in the past.
Disability of the wife
188.As I have said, in 1993 the wife suffered severe injuries to her left leg and other injuries.  I am satisfied that periodically the wife may need to undergo revision amputations.  But there is no evidence before me to support that such revisions will involve amputating her left leg above her knee.  Her injuries have not affected her modelling or public speaking.  She is able to ride, ski, and dance.  In 2007 she entered in the USA "Dancing with the Stars" (the equivalent of "Strictly Come Dancing") and earned  200,000 before being eliminated.  Her disability will not affect her capacity to care for Beatrice or her earning capacity in the future.
Wife's Earning Capacity
189.The wife's case is that her earning capacity is now zero.  The wife, as I have said, blames the husband for his attitude towards her working during the marriage.  That I have found to be a false case.  As to her earning capacity in the future the wife seeks to explain her position in paragraph 70 of her January 2008 affidavit.  Her career has been ruined, she says, by bad publicity.  She has received no offers of work in the UK and worked only once in the USA in 2007 (Dancing with the Stars).  She is unable to accept offers of work in the USA due to her commitments to Beatrice.  She says that she does not believe that she will be able to revive her career at any time in the foreseeable future.
190.In her evidence the wife told me she had looked for other work since April 2006.  She has tried to do speeches but had been vilified and she cannot get work.
191.I accept that since April 2006 the wife has had a bad press.  She is entitled to feel that she has been ridiculed even vilified.  To some extent she is her own worst enemy.  She has an explosive and volatile character.  She cannot have done herself any good in the eyes of potential purchasers of her services as a TV presenter, public speaker and a model, by her outbursts in her TV interviews in October and November 2007.  Nevertheless the fact is that at present she is at a disadvantage.
192.The wife would say she is at a severe disadvantage.  I think she overplays her hand.  First, she was able to secure in the spring of 2007 a valuable contract, Dancing with the Stars, from which she received £110,000 for 2 months work.  Second, in June 2007 she gave the following evidence to the Senior District Judge when being cross examined by Mr Peter Jackson QC for the husband.
"Q: Let me take it then that you are not going to be thinking of moving to Slovenia with Beatrice?   A: I am not thinking of moving anywhere and there are 20 statements live on TV shows to promote Dancing with the Stars - - -
Q: It will help us - - -   A: - - saying I will never move abroad, I will never live abroad, because I want to keep my daughter near her father.  I am renowned for saying that, and to suggest anything else is just speculation on what Paul or the press have put together.  Live, I have been asked it a million times and I have said I will never move abroad.  I want Beatrice to be near her father - - - -
Q: So we can ignore any thought that you might want to take Beatrice to Los Angeles or any other part of the United States or anywhere - - -   A: 100%.  100%.  I have turned down huge amounts of work.  This Dancing with the Stars was a one-off short thing that Judge Waller knew everything about in the last case and is not a tour, is not anything.  It had cleared my name- - -"
193.Her evidence there that she had turned down huge amounts of work is quite inconsistent with her assertion that her earning capacity is zero.
194.Third, during the hearing before me the wife was asked and agreed to produce a schedule of all offers of work from the US since separation.  She produced no schedule or list.
195.However, she did produce some documents which however did not lead me really anywhere.  She produced her contract in relation to Dancing with the Stars.  She donated £50,000 of her receipts to VIVA.  She produced a document from 44 Blue Productions of the William Morris Agency re possible project opportunities.  She also produced a letter of 2 November 2006 from Ed Hardy of Nervous Tattoo of an unsigned contract to model for a period of 10 months at a monthly fee of US  10,000.  The evidence is unclear whether she ever in fact contracted and worked for Ed Hardy.
196.I have no doubt that, despite the very adverse publicity in the last 2 years or a little under, the wife does have an earning capacity.  She has earned her living since the age of 17.  I have found that her association with the husband advanced, not stultified, her career.  If in the future she is circumspect about engaging with the media and/or adopts an emollient and less confrontational attitude to it, I think that the negative interest shown towards her will indeed subside.  She has the ability and experience in TV production and film making, other than as a role as a presenter.  She can in time continue as a model.  It may be that interest in her as a public speaker has very much waned and is unlikely to be revived.  Her opportunity to market a book about herself is probably at an end other than as a "kiss and tell all" book, which she told me she has no wish to do and in any event might well place her in breach of the confidentiality of these proceedings and of those concerning Beatrice.  She is currently undertaking a part-time course at UCL in nutrition.
197.She will take a little time to recover to a full earning capacity.  Mr Mostyn has suggested a year.  I consider that to be optimistic.  Two years is more likely.
198.Mr Mostyn has suggested that I should take a figure of £110,000 p.a. gross which is not far off the mid point between her gross and net earnings of the tax year ended 5 April 2006.  But that, of course, was when she was still in a relationship with the husband and thus earned at a time when she was benefiting from being his wife.
199.I think the right figure is £75,000 p.a. gross to be taken into account two years from now.
Wife's Income Needs
200.The wife's claimed budget of income needs is set out within a report dated 28 September 2006 of Lee and Allen which is annexed to the wife's Form E.  However the fact the report comes from a chartered accountant does not, as indeed the wife recognised, cloak her budget with any real legitimacy.  As I understand it, Mr Allen was merely assisting the wife in constructing a budget based upon her instructions and assumptions.  The wife did not call Mr Allen to give evidence in relation to her budget.
201.The husband called a chartered accountant, Mr Hobbs to give evidence about the wife's income needs.  He made a report of 4 October 2007.  Coleridge J on 20 December 2007 gave leave for this evidence to be given.
202.I am not going to go through his report or his evidence in any detail.  It was of limited assistance.  As the wife, with the assistance of Mr Allen sitting beside her, made clear to Mr Hobbs' in his cross-examination, his evidence was based on 6 (unidentified, except one) cases in which he had seen "aspirational" budgets.  The assets in each of the 6 cases exceeded £100m.
203.Mr Hobbs accepted that in 12 years of practice he had never had to undertake an exercise into what constituted reasonable income needs.  He had never before been asked to construct a budget.
204.That said, there are elements in his evidence and report which were of assistance, e.g. housing costs, airfares, rental of holiday homes and other similar information.
205.Mr Mostyn, basing himself on Mr Hobbs, submits that a fair budget for the wife would be £430,000 p.a. exclusive of security, of Beatrice's periodical payments and of the nanny.
206.The wife's budget is in the total figure of £3.25m p.a.  The wife has stuck to that in her Form E, her open offers, her oral and written evidence and in her submissions to me. In her open offers she agreed to accept a lump sum of £50m.  But this "concession" (as it was expressed to me) graphically illustrates the sheer unreasonableness of the demand for £3.25m p.a.  From the very first open offer on behalf of the wife on 22 December 2006 the needs of the wife and Beatrice have been put at £3.25m p.a. which after the application of capitalisation through a Duxbury calculation would entail a payment of £99,480,000.  To that is to be added (I quote from the wife's former solicitors' letter of 22 December 2006) "a significant monetary value on the compensation, contribution and conduct elements of our client's claim (running into millions of pounds)."  The letter continued:  "... However, in the interests of bringing matters to an expedient close, and avoiding the escalating costs being incurred by both parties, our client will accept a lump sum of £50 million, in full and final settlement of all her claims".
207.The claim and the offer are to be found repeated in Mr Pointer's note for the First Appointment in late February 2007, in his note for the FDR in October 2007, and in the wife's own, open letter of 31 January 2008 (but without any reference to accepting £50m.)  It should be said that Mr Pointer's note for the FDR contains nothing of a "without prejudice" nature and was included in the bundles before me with the express agreement of the wife and husband to assist me to see how Mr Pointer might have formulated the wife's case, had the wife been legally represented at the final hearing.
208.Thus the totality of the wife's claim is of the order of £125m i.e. including the capitalised income fund together with properties and/or funds to acquire properties.
209.Nevertheless, as I have said, the wife is (or at least was) prepared to accept £50m in lieu of a claim for £125m. That, in my judgment, can mean only one of two things; either the claim by the wife for £125m is a reasonable claim, in which case the enormous drop of £75m to £50m is inexplicable, or, the claim for £125m is and was unreasonable, indeed exorbitant.
210.If, broadly speaking, within the offer of £50m is a Duxbury capitalisation of £44.5m (i.e. a straight, amortised capitalisation with no Flick steps), then such a capitalised figure could produce for the wife an annual income of £1,500,000.  Thus it can be seen that the wife, in her own, open offers was prepared to forego £1.75m of annual income, no doubt in the belief that she would thereby have secured a fair deal which would provide her with a very comfortable, indeed very affluent, lifestyle. To continue to seek for £3.25m p.a. would suggest that the wife continues to press an exorbitant claim.
211.I shall now analyse the wife's budget.
212.It is based on a number of matters.  She claims for seven fully staffed properties with full-time housekeepers in the annual sum of £645,000.  She claims holiday expenditure of £499,000 p.a. (including private and helicopter flights of £185,000), £125,000 p.a. for her clothes, £30,000 p.a. for equestrian activities (she no longer rides), £39,000 p.a. for wine (she does not drink alcohol), £43,000 p.a. for a driver, £20,000 p.a. for a carer, and professional fees of £190,000 p.a. All these items Mr Mostyn submits are theoretically recognised heads of expenditure but "extraordinarily exaggerated".
213.He, next, submits that the following items are not only hugely exaggerated but also impermissible in principle.  They are £542,000 p.a. for security, £627,000 p.a. for charitable donations, £73,000 p.a. for the cost of business staff and £39,000 p.a. for helicopter hospital flights.
214.Mr Mostyn submits that the wife seeks not merely to replicate the marital standard of living for life but also to enhance it.  He submits that in a short marriage case it is legitimate to look at the claimant's needs more conservatively than in a long marriage, because the standard of living which has a bearing on the assessment of need will have been enjoyed for a shorter period. After a marriage lasting just under 4 years Mr Mostyn submits that it is unreasonable for the wife to assert that the marital standard of living should be reproduced for her lifetime.  Mr Mostyn draws comfort from a similar observation by Coleridge J in the directions hearing on 20 December 2007.
215.The wife, as I understand her case, says that far from replicating the marital standard of living, she is taking a reduction.  The wife would contrast her budget with the very high standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage.  As the wife states in her final submissions:
"I have based my claim on reasonable needs that I was accustomed to, before and during the marriage"
216.In the husband's Form E an analysis and breakdown of the husband's expenditure in 2005 was carried out.  It totalled £4,266,173.  It is apparent that £1,786,864 went on maintaining his properties in the UK and the USA, all of which (save for "Heather House" and the Cabin) were purchased before the parties' relationship began, indeed well before.  A distinction is also sought to be drawn between what is said to be "infrastructural" and "discretionary" expenditure (see paragraph 3.1.1 of the Form E), as the properties were acquired during his marriage to Linda, and since he has not and will not dispose of them. Thus the cost of running these properties was in place before, indeed well before either the beginning of the relationship in 1999 or the marriage.  Infrastructural costs overall are put at £3.7m and the discretionary spend was £549,000.  It is submitted that it is neither fair nor necessary for the husband to have to dismantle the infrastructure within the context of the breakdown of the marriage.  The cost of running the husband's properties and meeting other obligations is a guide of limited value to the computation of the wife's needs.
217.I consider there is some foundation for this submission, in particular that the properties were acquired before the relationship.  Although I agree that the husband's expenditure in 2005 is of limited value when assessing the wife's needs, his expenditure cannot just be ignored, whether infrastructural or discretionary.  I have to look at the broad picture.
218.One of the largest items in the wife's budget is security in the sum of £367,000 for the wife and £175,000 for Beatrice i.e. a total of £542,000.
219.The wife professes extreme concern for the safety and well-being of herself and Beatrice.  She wants round the clock security including bodyguards for herself and Beatrice.  She showed me a DVD of at least one paparazzi following her car in Brighton.  It is correct that in December 2006 death threats were made against her but there is no evidence that there have been any such threats since.  The wife told me in evidence that she has received abuse and nasty messages on her website.  She says she is concerned by "crazy fans".  She told me she wants security "until she is an old lady".
220.However her evidence on this contentious issue is at variance with the evidence she put before the Senior District Judge in March 2007.  On 6 March in her evidence to the Senior District Judge she said:
"Our life in Brighton is really beginning to shape in Brighton ....  I am so much happier now with life since the tabloid press have slowly begun to lay off me.  Yes, there are a few stories here and there; and yes, a few paparazzi still follow me around, but I expect this to pass and I am feeling very positive about our future"
221.Of course, a year has passed since then.  She unwisely gave interviews in October and November 2007 which may have produced intrusion into her life by the media.  But that was very largely self-inflicted.
222.The husband's evidence on security generally was to this effect.  In 2005 he spent £125,908 and £36,264 on security in the UK and the USA respectively.  The wife's claim re security is predominantly bound up with her relationship with the paparazzi.  At paragraph 16 and 17 of his affidavit of 22 February 2007 (sworn for the maintenance pending suit hearing) he said:
"Before Heather and I were married I had a fairly limited and low key security presence (unless I was on tour, which creates a very different set of circumstances).  There were never any bodyguards at Peasmarsh.  The general farm employees kept a look-out for anything suspicious.  There was virtually no security at Cavendish Avenue.  At the office complex in New York there would be one guard on the door given the location of the office in mid-town Manhattan.  There was an off duty police officer who provided night cover when I was at Long island, and on trips to and from the airport.  There was no permanent close protection during this period unless I was on tour or attending high profile events.  This was how I had lived with my first wife and our four children.
There were no real changes after Heather and I married until Beatrice was born. However Heather then began demanding, increasingly stridently, far more "security" to protect her from what she viewed as Press intrusion.  She did not suggest that she needed security for her or Beatrice's personal safety.  Rather her aim was to erect a barrier between her and the photographers.  Accordingly, whilst there was no security at the Cabin over and above the presence of farm hands, security was increased when we were at Cavendish Avenue, and was increased when we went to my American properties.  I must stress that I believe there was no need for this increase other than Heather's insistence.  Indeed, I have reverted to my former pattern of security in recent months."
223.At paragraphs 20 and 21 he said:
"Since the summer, I have, to my great relief been able to revert to the security arrangements which were in force for most of my "celebrity" life before late 2003, when Beatrice was born and when Heather began her campaign to increase security.  I now only have semi-permanent security cover at my Peasmarsh Estate.  Basically the farm staff working on my land keep a look out for anything suspicious.  There are no bodyguards.  The only person with me on a permanent basis is my PA, John Hammel who has been with me for thirty years.  The court will be aware that Heather now maintains several members of staff including a driver and a personal trainer.  Mr Hammel is only with me during the day or when I am working in the evenings.  I am alone at night (apart from when Beatrice is with me).  Mr Hammel has no security background or training in protection skills and cannot therefore be classified as a bodyguard.  When I am at Cavendish Avenue I have no level of close protection, save for the electronic systems already in place.  Obviously, when I go on tour, I have specifically assigned security.
My real concern with Heather's demands for bodyguards 24 hours a day is our daughter.  Unless on tour, my older children had very little security.  They all attended local state schools.  It is not healthy for a child to have security 24/7.  It sets them apart from their peers and makes them an object of curiosity and, at times, ridicule.  Such children live in gilded cages.  I do not want this for Beatrice.  I am rarely photographed with Beatrice.  She needs as normal an upbringing as possible, and surrounding her with round the clock security is not the way to achieve this."
224.Furthermore, he said in that affidavit that he found the wife's approach to the press contradictory.  On the one hand she loved and courted their attention. On the other hand she is obsessed with her portrayal in the media.  He further explained that the more the security the greater the interest shown by the paparazzi who enjoy the chase.  In his oral evidence he expressed much the same views.  He agreed that during the marriage there was a heightened level of security because that was what the wife wanted and he went along with it.  There was no need for such a level now.
225.The husband in his open offer has stated that he will undertake to the court to meet the reasonable cost of security for the wife and Beatrice for 2 years from the date of the order not exceeding £150,000 p.a. to be discharged by him directly upon presentation by the wife of invoices to her from the security provider.
226.In my judgment that is very fair and will meet the need of the wife and Beatrice for security.  I accept his evidence and viewpoint.  The husband is entitled to insist on invoices being produced.  Accordingly the item for security in the budget must come out in its entirety.
227.Running costs for proposed properties of the wife in New York, Long Island, and Los Angeles to the total sum of £332,000 must be excluded since I have found that the purchase/transfer of such properties is unwarranted.
228.Charity expenditure at an annual rate of £627,000 includes airfares of £180,000 for commercial flights, £120,000 for helicopter flights, and £192,000 for private flights.  I accept that the wife is very committed to charities and their causes but the degree of such proposed expenditure is, I am sorry to have to say, ridiculous.  However I do propose to allow in what I shall assess as her income needs (generously interpreted) a modest sum for carrying out her charitable activities and making donations to charity.  If she wishes to make further donations over and above that sum then she can do that from her earnings.
229.Holidays are put into her budget at £499,000 which is made up of accommodation at £242,000, helicopter flights at £35,000, commercial flights at £72,000 and private flights at £150,000.  I accept the wife's evidence that she has always since the age of 25 flown first class and that when she and Beatrice fly they should go first class.  The husband accepted this in his evidence.  But the figures given are much, much too high in every respect.
230.These items in her budget which I have touched upon above, illustrate generally speaking, how unreasonable (even generously interpreted) are the claimed needs of the wife.  In the absence of any sensible proposal by the wife as to her income needs I must do the best I can on the material I have.  If the wife feels aggrieved about what I propose she only has herself to blame.  If, as she has done, a litigant flagrantly over-eggs the pudding and thus deprives the court of any sensible assistance, then he or she is likely to find that the court takes a robust view and drastically prunes the proposed budget.
231.In my judgment a sum of £150,000 for not only holidays but also when in the UK (not on holiday) dining out, entertaining, and other interests, is appropriate.
232.As to the costs of maintaining Pean's Wood, a London property (£2.5m), and Angel's Rest I propose to allow £100,000.  Mr Hobbs estimated that the cost of running Pean's Wood was £50,100 p.a. and a London property at £23,250.  I propose to allow the wife £100,000 for all 3 properties.
233.As for staff costs (housekeepers/gardener and nanny) Mr Hobbs came to a figure of £78,832.  I shall allow £60,000 because Mr Hobbs has included a nanny for Beatrice at £20,308 which the husband will pay separately.
234.As to personal expenses the husband (through Mr Hobbs) has proposed £104,040 p.a. which includes a figure of £38,520 for health costs (chiropractor, surgery etc).  It does not include any amount for a personal trainer which, given the wife's emphasis on healthy living, fitness, and her disability, in my judgment, ought to be included.  However I do not consider she needs a full time personal trainer.  Doing the best I can, under personal expenses, I consider it fair to allow £120,000.
235.As to transport, the wife owns two cars, a Porsche Carrera convertible and a Mercedes 4x4.  The running costs of both cars I put at £25,000 p.a.
236.It has been suggested, through Mr Hobbs, that food, wine and flowers should be put in at £20,280.  In this connection the wife made much of the very large bills for flowers that were run up during the marriage.  That may be.  But, in my judgment, that is and unsure guide.  In any event she in her evidence recognised that the bill for flowers during the marriage was much too high as to what is needed in the future.  I shall allow £30,000 p.a. for food, wine and flowers.
237.I shall also allow £50,000 p.a. for professional fees.
238.I shall, exceptionally, include a figure of £50,000 p.a. to enable the wife to carry out charitable activities and to make charitable donations.  In my judgment this is warranted in the particular circumstances of this case.  Whatever else may be said about the wife, her devotion to her charities is very impressive.  Over many years, and in particular during the marriage, the wife was very generous in her charitable giving and did much work on behalf of her selected charities.  She very much wants to continue along this path.  The husband, too, was, and continues to be, generous to charities.  I do not think therefore that he can legitimately complain if the wife's budget includes such a sum.
239.The total of that expenditure is £585,000 p.a. which I propose to round up to £600,000 p.a.
240.In my judgment this will allow the wife to adapt to a standard of living that she could expect as a self-sufficient woman.  In my judgment after a short marriage to a very wealthy man it is unfair to expect that she should continue to live at the same "rate" as during the marriage.  Such an expectation is completely unrealistic.  I accept Mr Mostyn's submissions set out at paragraph 214 above.
Beatrice's Needs
241.The husband has offered to pay periodical payments for Beatrice at the rate of £35,000 p.a. plus the cost of a nanny not to exceed £25,000 p.a. both sums to be index-linked.  Nannies are expensive; good nannies do not come cheap.  I consider that Beatrice, a child of 4 with a father as wealthy as the husband, is entitled to a generous rate of periodical payments.  I consider £35,000 p.a. to be the right figure.  However I consider that the nanny limit should be £30,000 p.a.  Beatrice is entitled to a good nanny.  However, I wish to make it clear that this does not give the wife a licence to automatically engage a new nanny or pay an existing nanny at the rate of £30,000 p.a. willy nilly.  It is a maximum figure.  The husband will also pay Beatrice's school fees etc as per his open offer.  The husband will also put in place security to cover his obligations to Beatrice in the event of his death prior to Beatrice attaining 17 years or completing secondary education whichever is the later.
The husband's capital and income needs
242.These can be assessed in a sentence.  He has more than enough assets and income to cater for his needs.  I should add that the husband has an outstanding liability for legal costs in respect of these proceedings of about £200,000 (i.e. taking into account what he has already paid on account).  He has discharged the fees of Ernst and Young directly.
Conduct
243.Lastly, in respect of the matters set out in S.25 (2) I turn to conduct.  On the first day of the hearing before me oral submissions were made as to the relevance of conduct.  Having heard the wife and Mr Mostyn I ruled that neither party would be permitted to introduce allegations of either marital or post separation conduct.  I refused to accede to Mr Mostyn's fall back position.  I told the parties I would give my reasons in my judgment; and this I now do.
244.Both the wife and the husband wished to introduce the conduct of the other. In an email on 22 January 2008 sent to both parties I wrote:-
"On 11.2.08, having heard oral submissions from Ms Mills (i.e. Heather) and Mr Mostyn, I  shall rule whether or not any (and if so, which) allegations of conduct raised by either you and/or Sir Paul in affidavits pursuant to para 6 of the draft order of Coleridge J on 20.12.07 are relevant to these financial proceedings. You and Mr Mostyn must therefore come prepared to make submissions to me on 11 February as to why the conduct raised in those affidavits is relevant in these financial proceedings - see in particular section 25 (2) (g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973."
245.I, of course, had not then seen any of those affidavits subsequently filed pursuant to the order of Coleridge J of 20 December 2.2007.
246.Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 provides that in determining applications for financial provision the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case, the first consideration being given to the welfare of a child of the family under 18 years old.  S.25(2) mandates the court to have regard to particular matters set out in sub paragraphs (a) to (h) inclusive.
247.Section 25(2)(g) is one of the particular matters, namely:-
"the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it".
248.The conduct allegations are largely contained, first, in the wife's affidavit of 30 January 2008 between paragraphs 167 and 300 and, second, in the husband's affidavit of 8 January 2008 between paragraphs 130 and 188.
249.The conduct complained of by the wife can be summarised as follows.  Prior to their separation at the end of April 2006 the husband treated the wife abusively and/or violently culminating in the unhappy events of 25 April 2006 upon which, in her oral submissions, she placed great reliance.  He abused alcohol and drugs.  He was possessive and jealous.  He failed to protect the wife from the attention of the media.  He was insensitive to her disability.  Furthermore, it is alleged that post separation the husband manipulated and colluded with the press against the wife and has failed to enforce confidentiality by his friends and associates.  The wife blames the husband for the leaking to the media of her Answer and Cross-Petition which alleges in strong terms unreasonable behaviour by the husband against her.  The husband has failed to provide her with a sufficient degree of security from the media and generally he has behaved badly.
250.The husband did not seek to introduce any pre-separation conduct.  However, he did seek to persuade the court that it would be inequitable to disregard the wife's post separation conduct.  Paragraph 106 of the opening note of Mr Mostyn and Mr Bishop reads:
"In our Conduct Note we identify the three discrete episodes of post-marital behaviour by W which we submit pass the s25(2)(g) threshold.  The evidence in support of H's allegations is extensively laid out in his s25 affidavit at Paragraphs 146-176 >fr 1,8<X3/B13/58-74>fr 3,8<.  The court will also be invited to take into account other informative context namely W's unreasonable defence of the divorce (see the affidavit of Mrs Shackleton >fr 1,8<X1/A/63>fr 3,8< and pursuit of the libel/privacy proceedings >fr 1,8<X3/B13/74-77>fr 3,8<)."
251.Mr Mostyn distilled the wife's conduct into three episodes.  First, it is said on 25 June 2006 the wife illegally bugged the husband's telephone, in particular a call between him and his daughter Stella in which Stella made very unflattering comments about the wife.  It is further said the wife subsequently leaked the intercepted material to the press so as to discredit him.  Second, on 17 October 2006 the wife, or someone acting on her behalf, leaked to the media some or all of the contents of her Answer and Cross-Petition which contained untrue and distorted allegations against the husband in orders to discredit him. Third, the wife has failed to abide by court orders re confidentiality.  On 31 October 2007 and 1 November 2007 the wife gave several interviews to UK and US television stations in which she made many false statements about the husband and these proceedings in order to discredit him.  Individually and collectively these actions, it is said, represent a deliberate attempt by the wife to ruin the husband's reputation.
252.I shall now briefly sketch in the background to this issue.  In late April 2006 the wife and husband separated.  The wife instructed Messrs Coyle White Devine and from early August 2006 Mishcon de Reya.  The Husband instructed Messrs Sheridans and then from the end of June 2006 Payne Hicks Beach.
253.There were discussions as to how the parties were to be divorced, which seem to have broken down.
254.On 17 July 2006 the husband filed a petition for divorce on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour.  The particulars of unreasonable behaviour were extremely mild.  On 26 July 2006 the wife filed an Acknowledgement of Service saying that she intended to defend.  On 11 August 2006 Payne Hicks Beach wrote offering a divorce upon the basis of cross-decrees.  This was rejected by the wife and a draft Answer and Cross-Petition was sent.  It was drafted in very strong terms indeed.  Further negotiations took place which were unfruitful.
255.On 13 October 2007 the Answer and Cross-Petition was filed in the Principal Registry.  The Answer denied the husband's allegations.  The Cross-Petition alleged, with particulars, the conduct of the husband which I have set out above as pre-separation conduct, which the wife seeks now to litigate in this ancillary relief final hearing.
256.I should now go back a month.  On 16 September 2006 the husband filed his Form E.  At paragraph 4.4 the husband said that the wife's solicitors had intimated that she would raise conduct in the Ancillary Relief proceedings and if she did so he would counter any allegations.  For his part he asserted that since separation the wife was guilty of intercepting his telephone calls and leaking such information to the media.
257.On 28 September 2006 the wife filed her Form E.  She too, raised conduct as an issue which was largely a reiteration of the allegations in the draft Cross-Petition.
258.There is no doubt that in some way the wife's Answer and Cross-Petition and/or part of it was leaked by someone to the media.  Both the wife and the husband accuse each other of doing it.  The wife says that the husband did it in order to capitalise on his good press and to blacken the wife's name for making such unfounded allegations.  The husband says the wife did it in order to blacken his reputation.
259.On 18 October 2006 articles appeared in the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail which are said by the wife to be defamatory of her and/or a misuse of private information.  On 19 October an article appeared in The Sun which is said by the wife to be defamatory of her and a misuse of private information.
260.On 20 October 2006 the wife issued proceedings for defamation and/or misuse of private information against the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail.  On 25 October 2006 the wife issued proceedings against The Sun for defamation and misuse of private information.  At the heart of her complaints are that a)  it is alleged untruthfully that the wife or her agent leaked her Answer and Cross-Petition and b) the articles alleged untruthfully that her allegations in the Cross-Petition against the husband were in themselves untruthful and that she was willing to perjure herself in court.  Of course, the husband was not and is not a party to those proceedings.
261.The defences filed on behalf of the newspapers differ to some extent but, so far as the instant proceedings, are concerned, insignificantly.  Broadly they are that the wife, by herself or by her agent leaking the Answer and Cross-Petition, consented to the publication, that the wife leaked the Answer and Cross-Petition in order to damage the husband's reputation without regard for Beatrice's well-being and that her allegations against the husband of unreasonable behaviour are lies.
262.The wife's action against the Evening Standard and Daily Mail is set down for trial by a Judge and jury on 14 April 2008, with a time estimate 17 days.  At the time of the final hearing before me I was told that the parties to those proceedings had agreed to adjourn the libel trial.  I thereupon made enquiries.  I was told by the Queens Bench Listing Office that although it understood that to be the position, nevertheless no formal application to adjourn had yet been made.
263.On 25 October 2006 the husband in the ancillary relief proceedings issued an application for the case to be listed before a High Court Judge for directions as to the future disposal of the suit.  If the cause was to be defended, the husband sought leave to amend his Petition and to file a Supplemental Petition.  The proposed Amended Petition alleged a number of matters against the wife of verbal abuse, extreme jealousy, false accusations of violence, and that throughout the marriage the wife had shown a consistent inability to tell the truth.  The Supplemental Petition alleged, inter alia, leaking the husband's private phone calls include one with Stella, leaking of the husband's Petition and that the wife had leaked the Answer and Cross-Petition.
264.On 15 December 2006 the matter, by order of the Senior District Judge, was transferred to me.  Skeleton arguments were ordered to be filed setting out:-
"why the matter cannot proceed undefended or by way of cross decrees based on the minimum requirements to prove each party's case."
265.On 28 February 2007 directions in respect of the suit, the first appointment re ancillary relief, and the wife's application for maintenance pending suit came before me.  So far as the suit is concerned, at the very beginning of the directions hearing I told Mr Pointer, for the wife, and Mr Mostyn, for the husband, that I had formed some provisional views about the development of proceedings for divorce having read their full and helpful skeleton arguments. I asked them whether they wished to hear them.  Both kindly agreed to that course.  I then told them what they were.
266.After discussions between the parties I then made a consent order based upon the parties' agreement (as recorded in the preamble of the order) that as far as practicable one of the parties was to file a petition for divorce based upon 2 years separation with consent to which the other party was to consent and the suit would then proceed on an undefended basis.  Accordingly I stayed the Petition and Answer.  I gave leave for either party to file a second petition i.e. based on 2 years' separation with consent.
267.As to the first appointment, by this time the wife had put in issue the length of the parties' relationship.  She alleged seamless cohabitation from March 2000 through the marriage to separation at the end of April 2006, which the husband refuted.  After submissions I made orders referred to in paragraph 7 above.  The final hearing for ancillary relief was fixed for 11 February 2008 for 5 days.  The reference in the order to 5 days in May was not to be a fall back if the ancillary relief hearing overran but to deal with the suit in the event that the parties fell out over the divorce suit.  There was no appeal from any part of my order by either party.
268.It is to be noted that I made no order at all in relation to any aspect of conduct.  Neither the wife nor the husband made any application for permission to adduce evidence in the ancillary relief proceedings, whether from themselves or from any witnesses, as to each other's conduct.  Indeed Mr Pointer's note re the ancillary relief proceedings prepared for that hearing is completely silent on the issue of conduct.
269.However, Mr Mostyn did raise, first, the matter of the wife having tapes of the husband's conversations with a number of people.  The wife agreed to answer questions raised by the husband's solicitors in their letter 18 December 2006.  Second, as to the leaking of the Answer and Cross-Petition, Mr Mostyn described this as "central to the husband's conduct case".
270.There, so far as the conduct was concerned, the matter rested.
271.In June 2007 after a 3 day hearing before the Senior District Judge the husband and wife agreed to shared care arrangements for Beatrice.  The wife moved into a new home Pean's Wood near Robertsbridge with £3m contributed by the husband.
272.On 11.10.2007 Coleridge J conducted a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing which did not prove fruitful.
273.In late October/early November 2007 the wife took part in several television interviews about which the husband makes complaint.
274.On 8 November 2007 Mishcon de Reya and the wife parted company.  The wife thereafter has acted in person.
275.On 20 December 2007 there was a directions hearing following the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing before Coleridge J.  So far as conduct is concerned, Coleridge J ordered that within 7 days the husband do indicate whether he intended to pursue allegations of conduct, and that the parties do exchange affidavits (to include, if pursued, any conduct) and affidavits from witnesses by 11 January 2008.
276.What led to this order?  During the hearing as to directions, Mr Mostyn explained to the judge what the husband's case was.  The judge explained all that to the wife.  Her position, as expressed to the judge, was that if the husband brought in conduct she would bring in "the whole thing".  However at she said she was happy to leave conduct out completely if the husband too would leave it out.  Thus the judge said at F383 at line 28:
"Right.  I shall make a direction that within 10 days you >fr 1,8<I interpolate, this must mean the husband>fr 3,8< reconsider this question, and if you decide that you are in the circumstances not going to raise any conduct on the basis that she does not raise any conduct, then you must communicate it straightaway."
Mr Mostyn indicated he wanted to make submissions after the wife had finished.
277.Mr Mostyn then returned to the matter of conduct.  With reference to the wife's proposal to drop conduct if the husband too dropped conduct came this revealing submission from Mr Mostyn:-
"it is a beguiling submission, is it not:  "I will not raise the matrimonial conduct", which Mr. Justice Bennett has already said was unlikely to affect the result, "if he will drop his conduct", and then the Trojan horse of course, "We will leave his complaints to be sorted out in the open court 17 day libel proceedings", in which of course Lady McCartney does not have the disadvantage - the inconvenience of Sir Paul even being a party to it, and in which of course, to her satisfaction no doubt, it will be conducted in open court and reported in the world's press without even the protection of the 1926 Act.  So, I mean, if Lady McCartney were to say: Of course they will not be in any libel case", then we would give serious consideration to the suggestion ----"
Again:
"Mr Mostyn:  That is the very - well, fair enough.  That is the very issue that is going to be thrashed out in the libel.  There are two points in the libel.  One, are the contents of her answer in cross-petition true?  The newspapers say it is not, it is completely untrue.  She says:  "No, no, that is a libel".
Mr Justice Coleridge:  I understand that.
Mr Mostyn:  And, secondly, did he or she leak it?  Now, those are precisely the issues which form the husband's case in relation to matrimonial misconduct.
Mr Justice Coleridge:  I see that.
Mr Mostyn:  So what she cannot do is have a sort of proxy case conducted in open court before the world's press in which the husband is not even a party, whilst at the same time inviting your Lordship to say: "Oh, would it not be nice and peaceful if in the ancillary relief we do not mention it".
Mr Justice Coleridge:  It has got to be ----
Mr Mostyn:  We have got to be realistic.  If she wants conduct off the table, then it is all off the table.  But it is her decision.  We are not making it a condition of any offer.  She can do what she wants with it."
278.In his judgment Coleridge J said:-
"So far as 4 is concerned, this is the section 25 affidavit in relation to conduct.  There has been a great deal of discussion this morning about that.  The husband's position is that he limits his case of conduct to those matters mentioned in his Form E, which might be loosely described as post-separation conduct.  He will also answer any allegations that the wife has already made.  The wife has indicated that her position is that if conduct in any shape or form is raised and pursued, then she will find it necessary to deal with the whole question of conduct during and after the marriage.
I have listened to both sides and I am as sure as I can be in relation to these matters (about which of course I only have a preliminary view) that it is not in anybody's interests for these conduct allegations to be pursued in detail at the hearing.  So I have directed that the husband is to re-consider his position in relation to conduct, setting our very clearly what he is prepared to do in relation to that and what conditions he attaches to the dropping of conduct.  Mr. Mostyn has made it clear this morning, but I think it would be very helpful for the judge to have an open document setting out exactly what his position is. He has said to me that if all conduct allegations were not pursued, that is to say in these proceedings and in the libel proceedings, then he would quite possibly take the matter no further and the whole matter could be dealt with in that way.  But of course he feels vulnerable that if he drops the allegations, they will be raised again in another court in this building.  So it is not entirely straightforward and needs to be thought about.  So that is the direction I shall make in relation to para.4.
The position in relation to conduct is to be revealed within seven days.  If conduct is to go ahead, then both sides have to produce what are called section 25 affidavits.  These are simply statements - one statement each - setting out in as much detail as they want those matters upon which they rely.  It may be that in Lady McCartney's case, she will simply make reference to, for instance, other court documents, the answer, or whatever, but the court must be entirely clear which allegations she is pursuing and which she is not, because the husband must know so that he knows what case he has to meet.  More importantly, his lawyers know what case he has to meet and can prepare for it.  It is not necessary for this to be a minor novel, but in clear terms the allegations that are going to be pursued must be set out in an affidavit.  The husband says he can do it by 11th January.  I should have thought the wife can do the same. "
279.On 21 December 2007 the husband's solicitors wrote to the wife:
"Pursuant to the direction of Mr Justice Coleridge made today we write to set out our client's position in relation to the question of conduct.
1.For as long as your libel/privacy proceedings remain alive our client will pursue his allegations of post-marital conduct against you in the ancillary relief proceedings (as you know this includes the leaking of the Answer and Cross-Petition, bugging of his private calls and the breaching of undertakings and Court orders).  He will also seek to rebut your allegations of conduct in that forum.  He is not going to countenance a situation where he does not pursue his allegations against you (and meet allegations you have made against him) in proceedings to which he is a party and which are protected by confidentiality, when those same or very similar allegations are then going to be ventilated in open court in proceedings (before a jury) to which he is not a party.  The Judge accepted this.
2.If you discontinue, settle or otherwise get rid of the libel/privacy proceedings, our client will give consideration to not pursuing his conduct allegations in the ancillary relief proceedings, provided that you do likewise.  But we emphasise that our client will not even get to that position while the spectre of the libel/privacy proceedings being fought out in any way remains"
280.In her oral submissions to me on 11 February 2008 the wife adopted her skeleton argument on conduct which I have carefully read.  She submitted it was unjust/inequitable to disregard the husband's conduct.  She dwelt at great length on the allegations in her Cross-Petition, in particular the alleged assault by the husband on her on 25 April 2006.  From June 2006 the husband had plotted against her.  He had demolished The Cabin and locked her out of his homes.  She made an allegation of bad behaviour by the husband when he collected Beatrice on one occasion.  There were other allegations of misconduct put forward by the wife to illustrate her case that the husband had made her an object of a hate campaign in the media.  She confirmed to me that if the husband dropped his conduct allegations, she would drop hers.
281.Mr Mostyn adopted the arguments in his skeleton argument on conduct, which I have read with care.  He submitted that the statutory criterion (in S.25(2)(g)) was satisfied.  If the husband's allegations of conduct against the wife were not considered there was a significant possibility of the outcome being unfair.
282.The wife, it was submitted, had violently assaulted the husband's character, a person with a very high profile.  It was as damaging to this husband as a serious physical assault upon him.  He was being branded by the wife as a hypocrite and a monster.
283.Mr Mostyn then made short submissions on each of the three issues of alleged conduct.  To bug and then leak the tape was inequitable conduct.  As to the leaking of the Answer and Cross-Petition Mr Mostyn seemed to retreat, after being pressed by me, from the clear assertion in his skeleton argument that this issue of conduct involved not only leaking of a document but also of a document containing untruthful allegations.  He said the "untruthfulness" of the allegations against the husband "aggravated" the conduct of leaking the pleading.  He made a similar point about the interviews in October and November 2007.  The "breach" of confidentiality was "aggravated" by what the deliberate untruth of what she said.  His fall back position was that, if I was against his submissions, nevertheless he should be permitted to cross-examine the wife on those three issues as to her credibility on two other issues in the case namely that the wife should be compensated for her alleged loss of career and that the wife had cohabited with the husband from March 2000.
284.He briefly but firmly refuted the wife's case that any of her allegations could amount to conduct which it would be inequitable to disregard.
285.The court is obliged under Rule 2.51D of the Family Proceeding Rules 1991 (as amended) to deal with cases justly.  Dealing justly with a case includes, as far as practicable, a number of matters including saving expense, dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate, and ensuring that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly, allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need of other cases.

286.I am satisfied that the wife's attempt to introduce the alleged conduct of the husband prior to the end of April 2006 should be disallowed.  It would take many days, if not weeks, to hear and decide.  It can make no difference to the result.  It plainly is not conduct which it would be inequitable to disregard.  The allegation of 25 April 2006 is a sad incident in the marital strife.  Even if proved it is in my judgment part of the sad history of the breakdown of the marriage.  As Baroness Hale of Richmond said at paragraph 145 of Miller:
"..once the assets are seen as a pool, and the couple as equal partners, then it is only equitable to take their conduct into account if one has been very much more to blame that the other: in the famous words of Ormrod J in Wachtel v Wachtel >fr 1,8<1973>fr 3,8< 1 All ER 829 at 119, >fr 1,8<1973>fr 3,8< Fam 72 at 80, the conduct had been 'both obvious and gross'.  This approach is not only just, it is also the only practicable one.  It is simply not possible for any outsider to pick over the events of a marriage and decide who was the more to blame for what went wrong, save in the most obvious and gross cases."
287.In FS v JS   >fr 1,8<2007>fr 3,8< 1 FLR 1496 Burton J conducted a useful review of many, if not all, of the conduct cases.  Those authorities undoubtedly show that the conduct must be truly exceptional before it passes the statutory criteria.  The allegation as to the husband stultifying the wife's career is scarcely an issue of conduct and is capable of being dealt with under the heading of compensation and/or her earning capacity.
288.I also propose to exclude all the wife's post separation allegations of the husband's conduct.  Again, they can have no impact on her award.  It is not conduct which comes within (g).  Again it would take many days, if not weeks, to decide.
289.So far as the husband's allegations are concerned it is instructive to look at the husband's affidavit of 8 January 2008.  Although Mr Mostyn seeks to try to compartmentalise the wife's conduct into three distinct episodes, they are in reality examples of what the husband at paragraph 141 says is the wife's campaign since separation of trying to cause him harm, by portraying herself as the victim and he as the monster.  At paragraph 176 he returns to the theme of her "concerted campaign" as follows:
"I do believe that Heather's misconduct since our separation, her concerted campaign to destroy my reputation through leaks, lies and breaches of confidentiality, should be taken into account by the Court to reduce the award she could otherwise have expected to receive.  It will be for my legal representatives to explain this further."
290.The reality is that the husband's case is no more than the other side of the coin.  On one side is the wife's case of the husband running a media campaign to smear her; on the other is the husband's case that it is the wife who is running a media campaign to smear him.
291.The husband seeks to establish not only that the Answer and Cross-Petition was leaked by or on behalf of the wife with her full knowledge but also that the contents of the Cross-Petition are untrue - see paragraph 64, 65, 66 of Mr Mostyn's note on conduct.  The husband has gone to great lengths in his affidavit to show they are untrue.  Thus it seems to me that it is an essential part of the husband's case that not only did the wife leak her pleading but also that the allegations therein are untrue.  Surely, then, if I were to permit the husband to run this issue of conduct, the wife would be entitled to say that her allegations are not false but true.  Thus, as I have accepted the husband's submissions excluding the wife's case on conduct, it would be wholly wrong to allow the husband to raise conduct.
292.Mr Mostyn's submission that the "untruth" of the wife's allegations only seek to "aggravate" the leaking of her pleading seems to me to get him nowhere other than back into the arena of pre-separation conduct which he submits (correctly) should be excluded anyway.
293.As to the telephone bugging episode in June 2006, the wife denies bugging the husband's telephone line in June 2006.  In the conversation, as reported in the Sunday Mirror article of 9 July 2006, it is allegedly Stella, not the husband, who castigates the wife.  I reject the notion that simply because the wife may have committed a serious criminal offence of bugging, that alone amounts to conduct relevant under (g).  Furthermore, and centrally to my mind, this episode is part of the husband's overall complaint that this illustrates, and is part of, the wife's campaign to discredit him.  Both the wife and the husband accuse each other of conducting a campaign of harassment and vilification.  The reality is that if I let the husband deploy a case about bugging telephones together with subsequent release of them to the press, this will open up a can of worms and the litigation may inevitably snowball with claim and counter claim.
294.Breach of confidentiality - I, too, would exclude this.  In relation to the interviews of 31 October and 1 November I have read the husband's account at paragraph 73 of his affidavit.  I assume for the purpose of this judgment only that in those interviews the wife lost her cool completely, went right over the top, and behaved in an erratic, out of control, and vengeful manner.  But I have got to be robust about these matters.  This allegation again is to be seen as part and parcel of the alleged campaign of harassment and vilification.  I do not think that the alleged behaviour of the wife is going to assist me to arrive at a fair judgment for an award of financial provision.
295.In any event, what is the scale of the reduction in the amount of the award that the husband seeks in order to reflect the conduct of the wife, even if proved?  The short answer, is indeed, a mere token.  The husband's proposals are (see paragraphs 79-82 of Mr Mostyn's opening note) that the wife should have net exit funds of £15.8m less £809,000 to reflect the wife's conduct.  It is submitted that such a deduction is "a fair and not token expression of the impact of the wife's conduct".
296.It is obvious to me that £809,000 is simply a convenient, arithmetical figure to bring the figure down to £15m representing the wife's net exit funds.  There is no logical principle to underpin £809,000 or any lesser sum.  In any event whilst to the man and woman in the street, £809,000 is a lot of money, in the instant case it is not so significant that I should permit the husband to deploy a case of conduct.  It must be put in context.  As a percentage of the husband's wealth (which is roughly £400,000,000) £809,000 represents 0.2%.  Of £15,809,000, £809,000 represents 5.1%.
297.I regret to say that I strongly suspect that the motives of both wife and husband in trying to introduce the conduct of each other into these financial relief proceedings has got far more to do with the impending libel trials than the instant proceedings.  I accept that conduct was raised by each of the parties in their Forms E which predated the commencement of libel proceedings.  But matters have moved on a long way since then.
298.For the wife, findings in her favour particularly on the leaking of her Answer and Cross-Petition and on the substance of her allegations therein, may, in her perception, immeasurably improve her chances of success in the libel proceedings.  For the husband, precisely because he is not a party to the libel proceedings he seeks findings from me as to the wife's conduct (in particular that the wife leaked her Answer and Cross-Petition and that the allegations therein against him are untrue), which, in his perception, may stymie the wife's libel proceedings in which his alleged behaviour towards the wife are at the core.  Mr Mostyn's exchanges with Coleridge J on 20 December 2007 to which I have referred amply support that view.  In my judgment it is not appropriate for this court to hear the husband's conduct allegations merely because he is not a party to the libel proceedings.
General Assessment
299.Having gone through each of the matters in section 25(2) of the 1973 Act which the court is required to take into account I should now step back and look at the matter broadly and in the light of the relevant authorities.
300.I have been referred to the speeches in the House of Lords in the leading authority of Miller (to which I have already referred), in particular to what Baroness Hale of Richmond said between paragraphs 147 and 153 in relation to the source of the assets and the length of the marriage.  I would also draw attention to what Lord Mance said at paragraph 169.
301.The exercise to be undertaken by the court as propounded in Miller has been summarised in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Charman v Charman >fr 1,8<2007>fr 3,8< EWCA Civ 503, >fr 1,8<2007>fr 3,8< 1 FLR 1246 between paragraphs 63 and 73 inclusive.  I will not set out verbatim in this judgment what the Court of Appeal there said.  I have read Charman and these paragraphs in particular.  I would highlight paragraph 70 where the Court of Appeal said:
"Thus the principle of need requires consideration of the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities of the parties ...; of the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage ...; of the age of each party ...; and of any physical or mental disability of either of them ..."
302.I would also wish to refer to one sentence from paragraph 73, namely:
"It is clear that, when the result supported by the needs principle is an award of property greater that the result suggested by the sharing principle, the former result should in principle prevail: per Baroness Hale of Richmond in Miller paragraphs >fr 1,8<142>fr 3,8< and >fr 1,8<144>fr 3,8<."
303.Mr Mostyn encapsulates the husband's case at paragraph 40 of his closing submissions:
"In a short marriage where the assets were all in place prior to that marriage and where the assets have not increased by reference to "partnership" activity the wife should get a needs-based award.  The principle of sharing is simply not engaged.  This, of course, is the guidance of those passages of White and Miller that deal with inherited or pre-marital resources.  Pre-marital wealth is a very important factor and can act so as to displace the sharing principle altogether. Put another way, there can be a departure from sharing to need in a case where virtually all the assets are pre-marital or derive therefrom."
304.He thus contrasts such a case with a case of a short marriage where there has been a very substantial increase in the asset base e.g. Mr Miller's New Star shares, in which the sharing principle may be engaged.
305.In my judgment, the compensation principle set out in Miller is simply not engaged in the instant case given my findings of fact.  I say no more about it.
306.But is the sharing principle engaged?  In order to try to assess this matter it is important to see how Mr Pointer put the wife's case in his note of October 2007.  The wife would wish me to refer to it.  He broadly reiterates of the wife's case set out in her open letters from December 2006 onwards, though perhaps rather toned down.  He reiterates many of the points which I rejected in my judgment of 1 March 2007.  The only reference to a "marital acquest" is at paragraphs 22 et seq culminating in an assertion at paragraph 28 that the marital acquest is to be put at £60m.  In paragraph 44 it is said that the wife seeks provision of £50m which is a significant discount from her needs as computed in her Form E.  But there is no assistance to be gained from that note as to how £50m is arrived at.  As with the open offers of the wife set out in her former solicitors' letters, it does seem rather to be a figure plucked from the air.
307.I have searched, too, through the wife's skeleton argument of 6 February 2008 and her closing submissions for assistance.  But I have to say I found very little.  This may seem rather harsh upon a litigant in person, until it is remembered that the wife has had the benefit of assistance and advice from 2 lawyers, one of them an English lawyer, as her Mackenzie friends, in addition to the assistance and advice from her former solicitors and counsel from August 2006 until early November 2007.
308.Is there, in truth, a marital acquest?  The husband has sought to meet this point in his Form E.  I have already set out the relevant passage in paragraph 110 above.
309.The total value of the husband's assets as at 2002 and 2006 are £347.5m and £387m respectively.  The value of his business assets decreased by £20m.  The non-business assets increased by £41.5m of which £20.1m represents "passive" increase.  Thus any "active" increase is £21.4m.
310.I do not propose to enter into any debate whether this active acquest can be deemed to be a special or exceptional contribution of the husband.  I take Mr Mostyn's point at paragraph 147.5 of his closing submissions that if a fair sharing of marital acquest has any legitimate role to play in this case, it must be as a cross-check against the court's provisional assessment of the wife's needs.
311.In my judgment, in this case the needs of the wife (generously interpreted) are not simply one of the factors in the case but are a factor of magnetic importance.  In a case where the vast bulk of the husband's enormous fortune was made not only before their marriage but also indeed before the wife and husband even met; where the "marital acquest" (if such there has been) is of a very small amount compared to the total assets; where the compensation principle is not in any way engaged; where the marriage is short and where the standard of living lasted only so long as the marriage; where the wife is now and will be very comfortably housed; and where Beatrice's needs are fully assured, surely fairness requires that the wife's needs (generously interpreted) are the dominant factor in the S.25 exercise.  Any other radically different way of looking at this case would, in my judgment, be manifestly unfair.
312.I now turn to seek to capitalise the wife's income needs of £600,000 p.a.
313.It must always be remembered that the models of capitalisation referred to in the authorities, to which I shall now refer, are guides to reaching a fair capitalised figure.  They are not to be taken as rigid formulae.  They are useful tools in the search for fairness.
314.At paragraph 105 of his submissions Mr Mostyn submits that the wife's budget should be, at least at first, capitalised on the basis adopted by Thorpe J (as he then was) in Flick v Flick >fr 1,8<1995>fr 3,8< 2 FLR 45, where he said at p67:
"I think that Mr Lawrence of Coopers & Lybrand has right principle and good sense on his side when he distinguishes between the years of maternal responsibility and the potential years of dower beyond.  He has in his computations drawn a distinction after 17 years to reflect the youngest child attaining the age of 21.  At that stage his models postulate the introduction of £1m of capital.  I think that there is in this case a particularly sound basis for that postulation.  It is not simply the possibility that at that stage of life the wife would choose to occupy a smaller home.  It is very precisely that the capital cost of her primary home is inflated by the confines of the geography of the children's present schooling.  But when that phase of the children's life is complete there will no longer be the geographical confines expressed by the circle around the Berkshire house, and the expert evidence on both sides shows that the cost of a comparable property which is not so confined geographically is approximately £1m less than one that is.  So I find secure rational foundation for Mr Lawrence's assumption of a capital introduction at that stage of the contemplated future landscape.  I also find substance for his second assumption that the income requirements would at that stage reduce to 60% of the initial level.  Of course, I accept the force of Mr Pointer's submission that superficially there is an element of double deduction.  The child expenses have been combed out and provided for by periodical payments.  That provision will cease not at a stroke but by stages.  However, it is quite unrealistic not to recognise that future expenditure, like past expenditure, is never uniform but always evolving. At different ages of the human span the character of individual expenditure is very variable.  The wife, in her middle 30s, is at a stage of life when her expenditure is on the flood.  She has established social relationships with very rich cosmopolitan people.  She has no doubt a position to maintain in that world which justifies an annual budget as high as it stands even after pruning.  But as she ages so will her tastes, her recreations, and her values change.  I accept the worldly wisdom with which Mr Drew emphasises that, save in the area of medical expense, the graph of expenditure is a declining graph as age progresses."
315.Mr Mostyn submits that the capitalisation should take account not only of the basis propounded in Flick but he does not exclude taking account of a straight, amortised Duxbury capitalisation.  The Flick capitalisation would, he submits, be based upon the following:
i)Her budget of £430,000 falling to 60% of that figure in year 17 when Beatrice is 21.
ii)The introduction of £1.75m capital in year 17 (her London property)
iii)Earning capacity of £110,000 p.a. gross from age 41 to 60.
316.Of course these figures will now have to be substituted by £600,000, £2.5m and £75,000 p.a. gross respectively and after two years not one.
317.On Mr Mostyn's budget of £430,000 with his other figures the Flick capitalisation would be £7,609,889.  The straight, amortised Duxbury capitalisation i.e. without any reduction to 60% re the income needs, with no introduction of capital in year 17 and with no earning capacity, is £12,508,169. The equivalent figures for a budget of £500,000 would be £9,288,005 (per Flick) and £14,610,909 (per Duxbury).  For a budget of £1m the respective capitalised figures are £21,274,731 and £29,630,169.
318.It is fair to say that Mr Mostyn did seek to persuade me to adopt the approach in Fournier v Fournier >fr 1,8<1988>fr 3,8< 2 FLR 990.  But it is not a submission that he advocated in any great depth or with very much persuasion.  For, his proposal in his written submissions that the wife should exit the marriage with £15.8m is based on a capitalisation of her income needs at a mid-point between Flick and Duxbury, albeit with figures lower than mine.  In my judgment for me to take such a middle course is fair.
319.Taking the Flick and Duxbury capitalisations at paragraph 317 above I estimate that on the basis of needs of £600,000 p.a. a Flick capitalisation would be of the order of about £11m and a Duxbury capitalisation of about £17m.  Although slightly more for the London property (£2.5m as against Mr Mostyn's figure of £1.75m) must be folded in to the calculation, her earning capacity I have assessed at considerably less (£75,000 as against £110,000 and after two years not one).  There is one other factor.  As I have said, I have added back in to the wife's assets £500,000 for excessive expenditure.  If she had had that sum then that would have been free money for her to put towards earning revenue. That factor, too, I believe, should be reflected here to some extent.
320.Within the wife's assets are some £913,000 of bank balances and £683,000 representing Fiona Mills' mortgage and Sonya Mills' house.  The remainder of the wife's assets are in real property which I have found it is reasonable for her to keep.  I do not consider it fair to require the wife to put either of these two sums towards a capitalisation of her income needs.  First, the wife is most unlikely to be able to turn into cash either Fiona's mortgage or Sonya's house at least for some considerable time to come, if ever.  In my judgment it would be quite unfair to expect her to demand repayment of the mortgage to Fiona (even assuming that she was legally entitled to do) and/or to sell the house in which Sonya lives.  Second, in any event I do not consider it unreasonable in a case such as this for the wife to have a contingency fund which is represented by her bank balances.
321.Thus reflecting all the factors and looking at the matter broadly it seems to me to be appropriate to take a figure mid way between £11m and £17m.  All in all, in my judgment the fair capitalisation figure for the wife's income needs is the figure of £14m.  In addition she needs £2.5m to buy a London property.
322.Accordingly, I shall order that the husband will pay to the wife on or after decree nisi a lump sum of £16.5m.  This then means that she will exit the marriage with property and funds of £24.3m. Thus, in my judgment, the sharing principle, on the assumption that such may arguably be applicable here, is subsumed within her needs and indeed in the total figure with which she exits the marriage.
323.I consider this result to be fair in all the circumstances for the reasons I have sought to give.  If the wife considers that my adjudication to be unfairly low, then I would say this.  In the end it is for the applicant in ancillary relief proceedings to make a rational and logical case for the award that is sought.  If an applicant puts forward an excessive, indeed exorbitant, "claim" which then she (or he) attempts to moderate by way of open offers, but which offers still fail to be supported by rational and logical bases, then the applicant has only herself (or himself) to blame if the court awards much less than what the applicant expects.  This case is a paradigm example of an applicant failing to put a rational and logical case and thus failing to assist the court in its quasi-inquisitorial role to reach a fair result.
324.During the course of the wife's evidence Mr Mostyn asked her if she would consent to an order, subject to any leave to report being granted by the judge, prohibiting both the husband and herself and any persons acting on their behalf from publishing, disclosing, or in any way revealing without the consent of the other, the evidence, correspondence, transcripts or judgments in this case, the terms of the financial award and any marital confidences; and if consent was not forthcoming then the party seeking publication should be able to seek the permission of a Family Division Judge.
325.The wife agreed to a consent order being made in those terms.
326.I agree to make such an order.  Both parties want it and in the exceptional circumstances of this case it is just and fair to make such an order.  I shall also attach a penal notice to this part of my order.  But I should warn each of the parties that if either of them personally or through their associates transgresses, then the consequences for committing a contempt of court may be dire.  The penal notice will make that clear.
327.Mr Mostyn also suggested that I should issue a warning to the media not to publish matters covered by my order and that to do so would amount to a contempt of court.  I am confident that the media realise that both the Children Act and the ancillary relief proceedings have been conducted in private in accordance with the relevant rules of court and are confidential.  I am also confident that the media will respect the privacy and confidentiality of both sets of proceedings.  Beyond that nothing more needs to be said.